Abstract. In a piece published in 1981, H. M. Edwards touts the benefits of reading the masters. A quarter-century later, Edwards takes seriously his own advice by publishing an encomium on Euler's Institutiones (1755). While we agree with Edwards that we shall all do well by studying the masters, we argue that to derive the full benefit, one must read historically important texts without interposing a lens formed by one's own mathematical accomplishments. We show, in particular, that Edwards misses much of the style and substance of Euler's Institutiones by reading the text through a constructivist lens.
Euler on ratios of vanishing increments
Read the masters! is Harold Edwards' text shortlisting Euler among the masters [Edwards 1981, p. 105] . Let us therefore read Euler. In the Preface to his 1755 Institutiones, Euler writes:
In this way, we are led to a definition of differential calculus: It is a method for determining the ratio of the vanishing increments that any functions take on when the variable, of which they are functions, is given a vanishing increment. [Euler 2000, p. vii] (as translated by Blanton) Euler goes on to write that the vanishing increments involved in that ratio are called differentials, and since they are without quantity, they are also said to be infinitely small. Hence, by their nature they are to be so interpreted as absolutely nothing, or they are considered to be equal to nothing. (ibid.)
Euler's reference to equality in his comment about infinitesimals being "equal to nothing" can be interpreted in terms of a generalized notion of equality as follows. Euler discusses two modes of comparison, arithmetic and geometric, in § 84-87 of [Euler 1755] . Euler illustrates the arithmetic mode by ndx = 0 and the geometric by a±ndx a = 1. Euler's generalized notions of equality are similar to Leibniz's. Leibniz used a generalized notion of equality up to in the context of his transcendental law of homogeneity , showing Leibnizian calculus to have been more soundly founded than George Berkeley's criticism thereof. Euler goes on to give an example in terms of an infinitesimal ω:
Thus, if the quantity x is given an increment ω, so that it becomes x+ ω, its square x 2 becomes x 2 + 2xω + ω 2 , and it takes the increment 2xω + ω 2 . Hence, the increment of x itself, which is ω, has the ratio to the increment of the square, which is 2xω + ω 2 , as 1 to 2x + ω. This ratio reduces to 1 to 2x, at least when ω vanishes. Let ω = 0, and the ratio of these vanishing increments, which is the main concern of differential calculus, is as 1 to 2x. [Euler 2000, p. vii] Euler's procedure involves an increment ω described as being infinitely small. In the first few chapters of Institutiones, the ratios of vanishing increments for a few elementary functions are determined via power series expansions obtained previously in the Introductio [Euler 1748]. However, in Chapter 4 a different picture begins to emerge, including formulas for relations among more complicated differentials. Thus, Euler writes that if dy = pdx and dp = qdx, then the second differential Such insights are difficult to relate to from the modern viewpoint centering on the concept of derivative (rather than differential). This different nature of the infinitesimal calculus as practiced by both Leibniz and Euler was emphasized in the seminal study [Bos 1974 ] (on Leibniz see further in [Katz & Sherry 2013] , Let p/q be a given function whose differential we need to find. When we substitute x + dx for x the quotient becomes p + dp q + dq = (p + dp)
When p/q is subtracted, the differential remains, d
p q = dp q − p d2 , and adds:
since the term dp d2 vanishes [ob evanescentem terminum dp din the original Latin]. Euler thus obtains the formula for the differential d(p/q) in terms of dp and dq, namely what we would call today the quotient rule. Note the absence of power series and the presence of the idea of discarding higher order terms, such as dp d2 . We will see that this aspect of Euler's work is at tension with Edwards' interpretation. For more details on Euler's foundational stance, see [Reeder 2013 ], [Bascelli et al. 2014] . For related updates on Fermat and Cauchy see respectively [Katz et al. 2013] and [Borovik & Katz 2012 ].
How many strings does a flute have?
Harold M. Edwards opens his piece on Euler in the Bulletin AMS with a musical metaphor involving the lute and the oud. These are similar instruments, but in practice are used to play very different tunes. Edwards [Edwards 2007b, p. 576] (emphasis added) Alas, we have read the relevant passages in Euler but neither experienced the epiphanous "shock" Edwards reports, nor for that matter detected any such similarity.
As far as listening to Euler is concerned, at the very least it needs to be pointed out that Edwards lacks a perfect pitch. The first false note is already in his title "Euler's definition of the derivative," for Euler did not define the derivative at all. Therefore the answer to the question "What was Euler's definition of the derivative?" is: None, similarly to the answer to the question contained in the title of this section. Namely, the answer is that Euler doesn't give a definition of derivative.
Euler works with differentials throughout (see Section 1 for examples). The differential quotient plays an auxiliary role and always appears in a relation between differentials, such as the factor of 2x in dy = 2xdx when y = x 2 . Derivatives don't appear either in the Introductio or in the Institutiones, either under their modern name or as fluxions. Euler mentions fluxions in § 115 of the Institutiones as the English equivalent of differentials:
The English mathematicians . . . call infinitely small differences, which we call differentials, fluxions and sometimes increments. 1 When Edwards proposes to "rewrite" the ratio, he does not mean to replace it by a different quotient but rather replace it by a different expression which is no longer a quotient. For example, = 2x + dx, and the last expression still makes sense when dx = 0. Now the phrase "Rewrite . . . in a way that still makes sense" is certainly ambiguous. Does this entail developing into a power series and taking the linear term, or perhaps a different technique? There seems to be a conflation of definition of X and algorithm for computing X, which may be deliberate given Edwards' algorithmic and constructive philosophical commitments.
Euler's student Lagrange did introduce la fonction dérivée in his article [Lagrange 1772 ], but this was well after the publication of the Institutiones [Euler 1755] , the text Edwards claims as his source. One might have thought that Edwards merely simplified the title for greater accessibility, but the same jarring note is sounded in the abstract: "Euler's method of defining the derivative of a function is not a failed effort to describe a limit." Edwards is still out of tune in his introduction: "[Euler's] definition of the derivative is misunderstood primarily because his notion of 'function' is misunderstood." [Edwards 2007b, p. 576] . A crescendo "Of course Euler understood limits. Euler was Euler. But he rejected limits as the way to define derivatives" (ibid.) is followed by a coda "Since the definition of the derivative is still two volumes in the future," (ibid., p. 579).
Where did the infinitesimals go?

One of Edwards' major mathematical contributions is what is known as the Edwards curve x
2 + y 2 = 1 + d x 2 y 2 , a way of writing certain elliptic curves that, while apparently less elegant than the Weierstrass form y 2 = x 3 + ax + b, turns out to be more efficient, computationally and constructively speaking. His text on elliptic curves [Edwards 2007a ] appeared in the same journal a few months earlier.
The link to the Euler text is that, as noted in Edwards' Essays in constructive mathematics,
Euler too dealt with the curve y 2 = 1 − x 4 . . . , for which explicit and beautiful formulas can be developed for the addition law, . . . To require that it be put in Weierstrass normal form before the group law is described loses certain symmetries that deserve to be kept. [Edwards 2005, p. 127] . This is a fascinating historical observation, but reading Edwards on Eulerian calculus one may not even suspect that the ω appearing in Euler's discussion of the differential ratio is infinitesimal. In fact, [Edwards 2007b ] is nearly an infinitesimal-free zone (though he does mention an infinitely small z on page 578). His comment on students being "taught to shrink from differentials as from an infectious disease" [Edwards 2007b, p. 579, note 5] appears to share epidemiological concerns with Cantor's vilification of infinitesimals as the cholera bacillus of mathematics [Meschkowski 1965, p. 505] . However, none of this is faithful to Euler, as we saw in Section 1. In fact Edwards' comment is but the tip of the iceberg of attempted constructivist deconstructions of infinitesimals; see [Kanovei et al. 2015] for further details. Now it is certainly possible, mathematically speaking, to redefine the derivative as the coefficient of the linear term in the Taylor series. However, this was Lagrange's approach, not Euler's; see for example [Grattan-Guinness 2000, p. 100]. Edwards, possibly due to his constructivist leanings, appears to favor Lagrange's definition over Euler's. Edwards apparently believes that any great mathematician would agree with him on this point, and moreover he believes that Euler was a great mathematician ("Euler was Euler"). Edwards' syllogism, however, fails to persuade someone who wishes to undestand Euler's actual procedures, rather than what they should "really mean" for someone who thinks he knows what the unique consistent interpretation of this must be so as to save Euler's honor. Readers of Edwards' second Bulletin article presumably expected to get a fair picture of Euler's foundational stance from reading the article. This they arguably did not get.
Edwards' article might have been more appropriately titled Lagrange's definition of the derivative. Note however that in the second edition of his Mécanique Analytique, Lagrange fully embraced infinitesimals in the following terms:
Once one has duly captured the spirit of this system [i.e., infinitesimal calculus], and has convinced oneself of the correctness of its results by means of the geometric method of the prime and ultimate ratios, or by means of the analytic method of derivatives, one can then exploit the infinitely small as a reliable and convenient tool so as to shorten and simplify proofs" [Lagrange 1811, p. iv] .
(translation ours) While Lagrange didn't make the shortlist in [Edwards 1981, p . 105], we highly recommend both Euler and Lagrange. Read the masters! 3.1. Postscript. In a response to this article, H. Edwards finds our ideas strange, claims that they derive from set theory, and furthermore that the ideas of nonstandard analysis are strange; see [Edwards 2015 ]. However, our article does not say a single word about either set theory or nonstandard analysis. Edwards brings up the subject with apparently little justification. What purpose is served by claiming that nonstandard analysis is strange? Apparently the only purpose is an attempt to divert attention from the shortcomings of his own reading of Euler through a demagogical ad hominem attack, unworthy of a response. As a postscript we will merely point out that Terence Tao has recently published a number of monographs where he exploits ultraproducts in general, and Robinson's infinitesimals in particular, as a fundamental tool; see e.g., [Tao 2014 University, '84 ) is Professor of Mathematics at Bar Ilan University. In the fall of the '14-'15 academic year, he taught, together with a colleague, True Infinitesimal Calculus using H. J. Keisler's book Elementary Calculus to a group of 120 freshmen, prompting one of the students to comment as follows in a somewhat Hebraized English: "I really enjoyed learning this course and it was much understandable and 'fun' from the standard approach. My friends in other universities didn't really enjoy Calculus and actually kind of hated it but we really enjoyed learning it and even had some jokes about infinitesimal things in our lives :)" David Sherry is fortunate to be Professor of Philosophy at Northern Arizona University, Flagstaff, AZ, in the cool pines of the Colorado Plateau. E-mail: david.sherry@nau.edu. He took his Ph.D. at Claremont Graduate School in 1982. His research interests include history and philosophy of mathematics, especially applied mathematics, and history of modern philosophy (16th-18th century). He regularly offers courses in history of modern philosophy, symbolic logic, and metaphysics. When his nose is not in a book, he's likely hiking and looking at birds with his wife, making music, gardening, or playing with his grandchildren. Fortunate indeed.
